Women in Combat: Gender and the Armed Forces in Great Britain and Japan during the Second World War by Hayashida, Toshiko
Title Women in Combat: Gender and the Armed Forces in GreatBritain and Japan during the Second World War
Author(s)Hayashida, Toshiko
CitationZINBUN (2016), 46: 161-178
Issue Date2016-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/209944
Right© Copyright March 2016, Institute for Research in HumanitiesKyoto University.
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University




Gender and the Armed Forces in Great Britain and Japan  
during the Second World War
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aBstract: The aim of  this paper is to explore the gender problems raised by the mobilisation of  women 
in the wartime services in Great Britain and Japan during the Second World War.  Both countries faced 
the threat of  land invasion and introduced women into the armed forces.  In the case of  Britain, while 
young single women were conscripted as regular members of  the military, they were not qualified as 
combatants.  In Japan, towards the end of  the war, the government prepared for ‘decisive battles’ by 
organising combat forces under the direction of  the regular army, which included women as well as 
men.  These combat forces were actually formed in some regions.  Their members, including women, 
were not considered regular soldiers, but they were supposed to be given the status of  combatants.  On 
the contrary, the British government, which tried to maintain male supremacy in the military, strictly 
prohibited women from undertaking combat missions.  However, it was not very easy to draw a clear 
boundary between combat and non-combat actions because the difference between defence (air defence) 
and offence (counter-attacks) had become paper-thin.  Women who were assigned to anti-aircraft units 
quietly encroached on the intended gender barriers in the military, which presented a challenge to the 
conventional gender norms.
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During the Second World War, many countries introduced women into various wartime 
industries to cover the shortage of  manpower.  The mobilisation of  women was a necessary 
response to the demands of  total war.  It was imperative that women not only undertake 
some of  those civil jobs previously performed by men, but also serve in the military to sup-
port male soldiers.  Whether women serving in the armed forces were given combat roles 
depended on the gender norms and practical needs of  each country.
This paper explores the gender problems raised by the mobilisation of  women in the 
military in Britain and Japan during World War II.  As island nations, both were faced with 
the threat of  land invasion.  In Britain, around 500,000 women, out of  a female working popu-
lation of  seven million, joined the women’s auxiliary forces organised for the support of  the 
regular forces.1  Some women were called up under national service legislation that made war 
service compulsory for single women.  In contrast, at the beginning of  the war, the Japanese 
government excluded women from the army completely.  However, when the threat of  main-
land invasion grew more serious, the National Volunteer Combat Force (NVCF) was organ-
ised, which included female combatants under the direction of  the Japanese regular army.
The registration and conscription of  women undermined the prevalent notion that it was 
the man’s role to protect civilian and non-combatant women by taking up arms.  The disrup-
tion of  traditional gender roles prompted considerable controversy.  What were the main 
issues when the mobilisation of  women into the armed forces was discussed in parliament? 
How were the gender boundaries in the military, threatened by the women’s presence, main-
tained?  How did Japan and Britain differ in terms of  their approach to the mobilisation of  
women for military service?  The Second World War has been called a total war.  The sacrifice 
it demanded from nations meant that women were involved in warfare to an unprecedented 
degree – a fact that led to social and ethical conflict over traditional gender roles in many 
countries.  This conflict can be explored by using Britain and Japan as case studies.
1.
The integration of  women into the military in Britain had already begun before the out-
break of  the Second World War.  After the occupation of  Austria in March 1938, Germany 
began to prepare for an invasion of  the Sudetenland in what was then Czechoslovakia. 
Adolf  Hitler claimed that the German inhabitants of  this region were being oppressed by 
 1 Penny Summerfield, ‘“She Wants a Gun not a Dishcloth!”: Gender, Service and Citizenship in 
Britain in the Second World War’, Gerard J. DeGroot and Corinna Peniston-Bird (eds.), A Soldier 
and a Woman: Sexual Integration in the Military, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p. 119.
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the Czechoslovak government.  In response to the increasing threat of  war, the Auxiliary 
Territorial Service (ATS), initially a women’s volunteer service supporting the British Army, 
was formed on 27 September 1938.  On 29 September, the Munich conference was held by 
representatives from Germany, Britain, France, and Italy.  The Sudetenland was ceded to 
Germany on the condition that Germany would not invade the remaining territory of  
Czechoslovakia.
The Munich Agreement seemed to have averted the threat of  war.  However, in March 
1939, Germany violated the agreement, invading the whole of  Czechoslovakia.  This action 
spurred the formation of  the Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) and the Women’s 
Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) in Britain.2  During the First World War, female branches of  the 
military forces had been established in Britain and disbanded immediately after the war.  The 
expertise acquired during that time was applied to the formation of  new organisations that 
would make the best use of  personnel.  Prior to the declaration of  war against Germany in 
September 1939, Britain had already prepared for the possibility of  war and British women 
were smoothly mobilised into military forces.
When the Battle of  Britain began in July 1940, fear of  German invasion rapidly spread 
throughout British society.  It was true that island countries like Britain and Japan, which 
were surrounded by large bodies of  water, were more easily defended against foreign inva-
sion as compared to countries with land borders.  However, in the Second World War, the 
massive improvement in the performance of  combat planes and the carrying out of  air raids 
on big cities gave the island countries a more realistic fear of  invasion.
On 25 April 1941, Defence (Women’s Force) Regulations were introduced in Britain, 
requiring all women between eighteen and fifty years of  age to register for wartime services.3 
The prospect of  female conscription sparked considerable debate in Parliament but most 
MPs accepted the need for female conscription as long as married women were excluded from 
compulsory service.4  In December 1941, a male MP insisted that female conscription was the 
logical consequence of  women’s suffrage and that serving in the military was women’s civil 
duty.  There were, however, a few who objected to female conscription.  The Labour MP Mrs 
A. Hardie argued as follows:
I do object to women being conscripted for National Service.  My point is that war is not a woman’s 
job.  In spite of  the feminist attitude—and I am as good a feminist as anyone—I say they have no 
 2 Beryl E. Escott, The WAAF: A History of  the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force in the Second World 
War, Oxford: Shire Pub. Ltd., 2003, pp. 4–5.
 3 Alan Cooper, The Gentle Sex, Hailsham: J & KH Pub., 1999, p. 55.
 4 Lucy Noakes, Women in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex, 1907–1948, London: 
Routledge, 2006, p. 113.
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right to conscript women for war.  It has been a tradition for many generations that war is a man’s 
job, that women have the bearing and rearing of  children and should be exempt from war.  Some 
men and women say, “You ask for equality.  Therefore, women as well as men could be prepared to 
take part in war.”  That seems to me a funny argument, because we have not equality.  We have no 
equality in wages, no equality in the opening-up of  various services and so on.5
Mrs Hardie objected to female conscription, because she believed that the proper place 
for women was the home and that home-making was the paramount duty for women.  She 
also emphasised gender inequality in the military, in order to refute the idea that female con-
scription was the basic duty of  women.
On 18 December 1941, the National Service (No. 2) Act was enacted, which, in addition to 
raising the upper age limit for men from forty-one to fifty, made women in their twenties and 
thirties who were single and childless liable for conscription to wartime industry, civil defence 
or the armed forces.  Married women and women with young children were exempted.  Under 
the National Service (No. 2) Act, 125,000 women were drafted into the military over the next 
three years, and another 430,000, including married women, volunteered.6
The National Service (No. 2) Act was the first attempt by the British government to 
introduce compulsory military service for women.  The enforcement of  this act ensured that 
the ATS, the WAAF, and the WRNS, initially formed as volunteer corps, were formally incor-
porated into Britain’s regular forces and gave women official military status commensurate 
with that of  men.  Female officers held a full King’s commission.  For the first time, women 
in the military left behind the demeaning term ‘camp follower’ they had carried in the First 
World War.7
Rights, however, are accompanied by obligations, and female members of  the military 
would be subject to military law and to such penalties as might be prescribed.8  They would 
not be free to decide which services they would join or leave at will.  They were required 
to obey official appointments, including those that would send them overseas.  Moreover, 
there was an appreciable difference between men and women in the military.  Unlike their 
male counterparts, female military members were neither trained nor qualified as combat-
ants.  They were strictly prohibited from combat missions.  There was also a wage difference 
between men and women in the military.  Women serving in the ATS, the WAAF, and the 
WRNS were paid two-thirds of  the equivalent male wages and pensions, and their rations 
 5 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 376, 2 December 1941, cols. 1079–1082.
 6 D’Ann Campbell, ‘Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union’, The Journal of  Military History, 57:2, 1993, p. 306.
 7 Noakes, Women in the British Army, pp. 114–115.
 8 Escott, The WAAF, p. 6.
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were four-fifths of  what men received.9
In the House of  Commons, on 3 August 1943, Edith Summerskill, Labour Party MP for 
Fulham and a leader of  fourteen wartime female MPs, objected to the wage differentials 
between men and women as follows:
The United States of  America and the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics are paying their women 
in the Services and in industry at the same rates as men … The argument is that women [in the 
British armed forces] are regarded as non-combatant and, therefore, have to be paid at a lower rate 
than the men.  If  that is so, what about the men of  the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Pioneer 
Corps who are non-combatants but are paid at the same rate as combatants? … In war-time does 
the degree of  danger determine the rate of  pay?  If  we argue that it does and that women should 
be paid more cheaply, we must argue that a private in the front line in Sicily should be paid more 
than a general in Whitehall.10
Summerskill severely criticised women’s non-combatant status as an excuse for gender-
based wage differentials.11
The ATS, the WAAF, and the WRNS were formed in order to release as many men as 
possible from day-to-day tasks in the military to the front lines.  Thus, women were only 
employed in non-operational support positions as clerks, telephonists, cooks, drivers, and 
orderlies, with duties that were not directly related to military tactics and considered in line 
with the accepted definition of  femininity.  However, some women in the military became 
involved in a wide variety of  more masculine jobs, such as mechanics, wireless/radar opera-
tors, code-breakers, and intelligence personnel.  Many of  these assignments were kept secret 
and the women engaging in such works were required to sign the Official Secrets Acts, which 
forbade them from speaking of  their duties for many years to come.12
As the threat of  air raids and invasion grew, the sphere of  women’s activities expanded 
even further into the previously male-only space.  After the beginning of  the London Blitz, air 
defences in Britain were short by about 20,000 men.  Although women were still prohibited 
from serving in battle, WAAF and ATS members took part in air defences.  Some members 
of  the WAAF controlled barrage balloons, which were huge bags of  gas operated in high 
winds and anchored to the ground.  They were loaded with high explosives along their cables 
to deny enemy planes low-level airspace.  There were 257 barrage balloon operators in May 
1941.  By 1943, many balloon sites were managed by all female-crews and forty-seven per 
 9 Escott, The WAAF, pp. 10–11.
 10 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 376, 2 December 1941, cols. 2113–2114.
 11 Edith Summerskill, ‘Conscription and Women’, The Fortnightly, vol. 151, March, 1942, p. 207.
 12 Escott, The WAAF, p. 19.
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cent of  Balloon Commands were retained by women.13
On 25 April 1941, regulations were adopted which were to permit deployment of  women 
in anti-aircraft (AA) batteries for intercepting enemy planes in flight.14  On 21 August 1941, 
the mixed anti-aircraft (AA) batteries became operational.  The batteries were composed of  
members of  the ATS and the British Army Royal Artillery.  The mixed AA batteries, how-
ever, did not equalise the roles of  men and women.  Women were given the Royal Artillery 
grenade badge, and corporals were called ‘bombardiers’ and privates ‘gunners’, though they 
officially belonged to the ATS and not to the Royal Artillery.15  However, the units of  AA bat-
teries were commanded by men, and the official function of  ATS female officers was limited 
to supervising the behaviour of  the enlisted women.16
The strength of  the AA Command gradually increased, and by 1942, more women were 
working on AA sites than men were, and nearly fifty per cent of  new ATS recruits were 
to work as members of  the mixed AA batteries.  By September 1943, over 56,000 women 
had joined.17  The women of  AA Command reportedly maintained good composure when 
discharging their duties.  General Sir Frederick Pile, Commander of  Britain’s AA defences, 
remarked in his memoir published four years after the end of  the war: ‘December 8 [1941] 
was the first time the battery had been in action.  Beyond a little natural excitement and a 
tendency to chatter when there was a lull, they behaved like a veteran party, and shot an 
enemy plane into the sea’.18  Vera Robinson, a former member of  AA batteries, recalled in her 
autobiography as follows:
[Women never] showed any fear whatsoever while a raid was in progress when on duty on the 
Command Post.  Guns could be thundering beside us, the enemy threatening in the skies above 
us, but so totally immersed in our individual tasks were we, that the only emotion felt by us was a 
desire to destroy that which we had been trained to destroy as quickly as possible.19
When the National Service (No. 2) Bill was under consideration in the House of  Commons, 
 13 Escott, The WAAF, p. 16.
 14 Gerard J. De Groot, ‘“I Love the Scent of  Cordite in Your Hair”: Gender Dynamics in Mixed Anti-
Aircraft Batteries during the Second World War’, History, 82:265, 1997, p. 74.
 15 Gerard J. De Groot, ‘Combatants or Non-combatants?: Women in Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries 
during the Second World War’, Royal United Services Institute Journal, 140:5, 1995, p. 65.
 16 Campbell, ‘Women in Combat’, p. 307.
 17 Gerard J. DeGroot, ‘Whose Finger on the Trigger?  Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries and the Female 
Combat Taboo’, War in History, 4:4, 1997, p. 436.
 18 Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain’s Defence against Air Attack during the Second World War, 
London: George G. Harrap and Co.Ltd., 1949, p. 193.
 19 Vera Robinson, On Target, Wakefield: Verity Press, 1991, p. 198.
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whether or not women should be compulsorily assigned to anti-aircraft sites was a signifi-
cant point of  contention.20  The activities of  the AA batteries were the closest to actual battle 
conditions that women would experience.  Most MPs were reluctant to implement compul-
sory enlistment in AA batteries for women, which they considered to be in conflict with 
maternity protection.  Mobilising women in such a way as to put them in harm’s way and 
making them take the lives of  sons born of  other mothers was absolutely offensive to the 
prevailing gender beliefs.21
It was eventually decided that women could join the AA batteries on a volunteer basis. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted: ‘Women will have the right to volunteer, but no 
women in the ATS will be compelled to go to the batteries … I want to make it clear that 
a woman may be compelled to join the ATS, but only volunteers from within the ATS will 
be allowed to serve with the guns’.22  Women volunteers in AA Command worked as radar 
operators, height finders, spotters, predictors, and locators on the sites, but only men were 
allowed to load and fire the guns.  Despite the fact that women working on AA command 
assisted in the targeting and shooting down of  aircraft, they were still officially considered 
‘non-combatants’.  Though women could not be forcibly assigned to the mixed AA batteries, 
men could.  Thus, the final barrier between male combatants and female non-combatants was 
theoretically maintained.23
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants in the AA batteries was based 
on whether a person pulled the trigger or not.  Moral objections to arming women were 
widely promulgated.  The general opinion was that women, whose role was to give birth to 
and raise children, were unsuited to taking a person’s life.  The pulling of  a trigger was cor-
related with and symbolised killing, and killing was the men’s job.  The ‘trigger principle’, 
by which the line between the sexes in the AA batteries was drawn, was endorsed by public 
opinion.
While Sir Frederick Pile wanted to promote the extension of  women’s tasks in the AA 
batteries, he understood that the majority of  the public regarded the trigger as sacred.  Pile 
recalls in his book: ‘As a matter of  fact, I could see no logical reason why they should not fire 
the guns … However, I was not going to suggest going as far as employing them on lethal 
weapons.  I was quite aware that there would be struggle enough to get their employment 
through in any operational form at all’.24
Eleanor Rathbone, a prominent feminist and independent MP for the Combined English 
 20 The National Archives (TNA), LAB 76/3, Wages Policy in the United Kingdom in the Second 
World War, p. 108.
 21 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 370, Woman-Power Debate, cols. 325, 351–353.
 22 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 376, 2 December 1941, col. 1038.
 23 Noakes, Women in the British Army, p. 116.
 24 Pile, Ack-Ack, p. 186.
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Universities, insisted that depriving women of  combatant status was discrimination.  She 
claimed that women displaying ardent patriotism and abilities should be allowed to fight 
as combatants in AA batteries.25  It was absolutely unreasonable to deny those women who 
spotted targets and helped aim the guns the power of  pulling the triggers.  As Pile argues: 
‘[T]here was a good deal of  muddled thinking which was prepared to allow women to do 
anything to kill the enemy except actually press the trigger’.26  There was not much essential 
difference between finding the height of  a plane and firing at a plane because both were parts 
of  the same operation against an enemy.  In practice, some female gunners testified that they 
received rifle instructions, supposedly in preparation for the threat of  an invasion.  One of  
these women, Vera Robinson, recalled the day when she was assigned rifle practice for the 
first time: ‘Our glory was short-lived for that was the only time we handled a rifle in our army 
career’.27  Rifle training was popular among female members because it was seen to represent 
their unique status as a regular soldier of  the army.28
If  the AA batteries could not achieve their ultimate purpose, that is, keeping the enemy 
from landing, female members of  the batteries were to be evacuated immediately.  The pres-
ence of  women in the batteries was only justified under the assumption that German invaders 
would respect the non-combatant status of  women and therefore not take them as prisoners.29 
Summerskill told the House of  Commons in 1943 that this was ‘a ludicrous piece of  wishful 
thinking … Surely nobody here thinks for one moment that the Germans will treat women on 
gun-sites as non-combatants’.30
One might well wonder how the women who volunteered in the AA batteries felt about 
the combat taboo imposed upon them.  G. Morgan, who served as a young ATS private in 
the 573rd Heavy AA Battery, noted in her memoir: ‘We have learned to do every job in camp 
except fire the guns and I bet we could do that too if  we were allowed’.31  With this excep-
tion, there are few remarks on the exclusion of  women from combat in books or memoirs 
written by female members of  AA batteries.  G. J. DeGroot, corresponding with some former 
members of  ATS, argues that most women in the mixed AA command seem to have given 
little consideration to the matter.  For instance, Elizabeth Lapham, with whom DeGroot cor-
responded by letter, said: ‘I do think it was stupid … We were (and now are) just as able to 
 25 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 376, 1941, col. 1087.
 26 Pile, Ack-Ack, p. 193.
 27 Robinson, On Target, p. 40.
 28 Tessa Stone, ‘Creating a (gendered?) Military Identity: The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force in Great 
Britain in the Second World War’, Women’s History Review, 8:4, 1999, p. 617.
 29 DeGroot, ‘Whose Finger on the Trigger?’, p. 444.
 30 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 391, 3 August 1943, col. 2114.
 31 Imperial War Museum, ref. pp/MGR/115, G. Morgan, personal memoir.
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use firearms as the men … [but] I don’t think it bothered us too much at the time.  We just 
accepted it’.  Jacqueline Foster, another of  the women serving on an AA battery, said: ‘I do 
not remember thinking at that time about the fact that women were not allowed to fire the 
guns … Nor do I know the reason for this rule’.32  Though the combat taboo was imposed 
upon women in order to preserve the “male-only” space in the military, women excluded from 
combat roles do not seem to have been conscious of  their situation.  The line drawn between 
combatants and non-combatants was not so clear in the AA batteries, because they had both 
defensive and offensive roles.  The ‘trigger principle’ could not constitute an insuperable bar-
rier between the sexes in the armed forces.
2.
In addition to the AA batteries, a volunteer corps for national defence was organised in 
Britain during the Second World War.  In May 1940, the Local Defence Volunteers was estab-
lished in response to the advance of  German troops, changing its name to the Home Guard in 
June 1940.  It was an armed, volunteer defence force of  men between the ages of  seventeen 
and sixty-five who were not already in the military service.  The National Service (No. 2) Act 
in 1941 introduced the conscription of  men to the Home Guard.  Men from the ages of  eigh-
teen to fifty-one, who were not already in the armed forces, could henceforth be compelled to 
serve part-time in the Home Guard.33  The organisation was under the direction of  the War 
Office, and the number of  volunteers reached over 1.5 million at its peak.
Women were excluded from the Home Guard until 1943.34  Although the guard was 
dependent on volunteers and chronically short of  manpower, women who wanted to join were 
rebuffed for the three years during which the threat of  invasion was greatest.  In November 
1941, when the National Service (No. 2) Act was being debated, RAF Squadron-Leader Eric 
Errington, Conservative MP for Bootle, advocated the introduction of  women to the Home 
Guard:
I have had an opportunity of  speaking to a number of  women of  different classes, and they all ask 
what they can do if  the invader comes … They are asking what they should do if  a German came 
to their door.  [An Hon. Member: ‘Shoot him’.] But they have nothing to shoot him with, and the 
women are not to be trained … I wish, and I am sure everyone wishes, that women and children 
could be kept completely out of  this war, but I do not believe that to be possible.  In Russia, women 
are right in the war.  Why should not our women be taught the use of  hand-grenades and revolvers 
 32 DeGroot, ‘Whose Finger on the Trigger?’, p. 447.
 33 Summerfield, ‘She Wants a Gun not a Dishcloth!’, p. 123.
 34 Summerfield, ‘She Wants a Gun not a Dishcloth!’, p. 120.
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with which they could protect themselves?  Most people take the view that they would like to kill 
at least one German.35
Nevertheless, despite the growing sense of  crisis and the impending enactment of  the 
National Service (No. 2) Act, women were not permitted to join the Home Guard.  This was in 
part because the Home Guard, a secondary defence force, could be called upon to accomplish 
a combat mission in case of  German invasion.  However, this was not the only reason.  Most 
people considered war to be a primarily masculine affair.  While the Home Guard was an 
armed force, it did not conform to the same standards of  masculinity as the regular forces. 
Most members were too old or too young to serve in the regular army.  Because of  their 
ineligibility, members of  the Home Guard already felt that their masculinity was being ques-
tioned; the presence of  women in the guard would only further erode the masculine image of  
the Home Guard, and so women were excluded.
In the House of  Commons, MPs like Mavis Tate, Eleanor Rathbone, and Edith 
Summerskill attempted to promote women’s eligibility for membership in the Home Guard.36 
They met fierce opposition from the War Office and could not overcome it.  As a counter-
measure, the Women’s Home Defence (WHD), a voluntary armed force to support the Home 
Guard, was developed under Summerskill’s direction in June 1940.  In March 1942, there were 
about 10,000 WHD members in London alone.  Thirty WHD units were formed in January 
1942 and by December 1942, there were said to be 250 such units.37
The WHD was not only ‘unofficial’ but also technically illegal, because it provided 
women with training in the use of  rifles, and hence the organisation constituted a private 
army outside the authority of  the Crown.  The WHD broke the combat taboo by offering 
women the opportunity to practice with firearms.  A leaflet about the organisation explained 
that its objective was to train ‘every woman in the country to be of  maximum use in the event 
of  an invasion’.38  References to the WHD appear in the War Office files from December 1940; 
however, no legal proceedings to stop WHD activities were taken so as to avoid protest.39
Summerfield and Peniston-Bird argue that the gender boundary around the Home Guard 
had been also breached.  ‘Women were joining Home Guard units and training with their male 
members, at least some of  whom evidently did not subscribe to the taboo deeply embedded in 
 35 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 376, 13 November 1941, col. 109.
 36 TNA, WO 32/9423, Letter from Marvis Tate to Anthony Eden, 10th December 1940, Hansard, 
House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 362, 25th June 1940, col. 281.
 37 Hansard, House of  Commons, 5th Series, vol. 385, 8th December 1942, cols. 1413–1414.
 38 TNA, WO 32/9423, Letter from Summerskill to P. J. Grigg, 29th March 1942.
 39 Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird, ‘Women in the Firing Line: the Home Guard and 
the Defence of  Gender Boundaries in Britain in the Second World War’, Women’s History Review, 
9:2, 2000, p. 235.
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the thinking of  the political leaders’.40  Yvette Bayes, a former member of  a Home Guard unit, 
recalled that the unit was formed in 1941 or 1942 in the Birmingham munitions firm where 
she worked as a secretary, and that the men wanted women to help them with clerical work. 
However, she was to find that gender boundaries in the unit were not effectively working. 
She wore a uniform that her mother had modified from a male uniform, and participated in 
combat training with the male members.41
As the combat training of  women came to be commonly practiced, the War Office finally 
sent an order to all Home Guard units that such training had not been authorised: ‘Weapons 
and ammunition in the charge of  the Army or of  Home Guard units must not be used for 
the instruction of  women.’ Although manpower shortages in the Home Guard were serious, 
it was not until April 1943 that women were officially admitted into the Home Guard as aux-
iliaries.42
By 1944, there were more than 32,000 women in the Home Guard.43  Women eligible for 
recruitment were between the ages of  eighteen and sixty-five, preferably over forty-five, and 
they were not to wear uniforms except for plastic badges.  They did not receive weapons 
training, but were to perform non-combatant duties such as clerical work, cooking, and driv-
ing.  They were not granted the status of  soldiers, but were still considered civilians.  Thus, 
full equality was not given to women in the Home Guard, because it was incompatible with 
the persistent gender norms.
In fact, it would seem that the Home Guard had opened its doors to women in large 
part for the sake of  restoring the gender order disturbed by the WHD.  Women who joined 
the Home Guard as auxiliaries were not permitted to carry weapons or wear uniforms, and 
gender inequality in the Home Guard was reinstituted.  Once the threat of  a German land 
invasion subsided, the gender boundary weakened by the WHD was reinstated.44  Thus, the 
new roles that might have been created for women by the state of  total war were stifled by 
the preservation of  conventional gender roles.
3.
In December 1941, the Pacific War broke out.  In the early stages of  the war, Japan 
successfully occupied Hong Kong, British Malaya, Java, and the Philippines among others. 
However, as the range of  operations rapidly expanded, Japan gradually became inferior in 
 40 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, ‘Women in the Firing Line’, p. 237.
 41 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, ‘Women in the Firing Line’, p. 248.
 42 Summerfield, ‘She Wants a Gun not a Dishcloth!’, p. 130.
 43 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, ‘Women in the Firing Line’, p. 244.
 44 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, ‘Women in the Firing Line’, p. 238.
TOSHIKO HAYASHIDA
172
military strength.  After losing command of  the sea following their defeat at the Battle of  
Midway in 1942, Japanese troops were compelled to retreat from territories under occupation. 
From 1944 to 1945, there were some decisive battles at Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa. 
The results of  these fierce battles caused additional concerns for a Japanese government 
responsible for deploying sufficient numbers of  combat units to defend the mainland.
During the Second World War, national defence consisted of  a positive defence and a 
negative defence.  The former was accomplished by intercepting enemy planes and block-
ing aerial navigation.  The latter included restrictions on lighting, compulsory evacuation, 
firefighting, and creating a fire protection area.45  While Britain organised the system of  air 
defence with the most advanced radar in 1940, Japan lagged behind the allies in technologi-
cal development for air defence.  Although the Japanese government predicted that the U.S. 
military would attack big cities with incendiary bombs, they were unable to prepare suffi-
cient number of  military units for air defence.  The Japanese urban structure was such that 
wooden houses were built closely together, rendering them vulnerable to air raids, especially 
attack by incendiary bombs.
In 1945, the U.S. military changed its strategy from high-precision bombardment against 
limited targets to low-altitude incendiary bombardment.  They carried out several devastat-
ing air raids to burn down principal cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe.  The 
Japanese army was forced to make preparations for land invasion.  The government adopted 
the tactics of  restricting air defence and retaining military strength for the upcoming decisive 
battle.  Until the Battle of  Okinawa broke out, positive air defence by the military had hardly 
begun to operate.46
On 23 March 1945, just before the Battle of  Okinawa began, the formation of  the 
National Volunteer Force (NVF) (国民義勇隊 Kokumin Giyūtai) was agreed upon by the 
cabinet.47  Up until this point, there had been scarcely any examples of  women entering the 
army, one exception being the Women’s Communication Corps (女性通信隊 Jyosei tsūshintai) 
formed within the Air Defence Intelligence Corps (防空情報隊 Bōkū Jyōhōtai) of  the Army 
Eastern Military Command (東部軍 Tōbu Gun) in 1943.48  The NVF was composed of  men 
 45 Jun Yanagisawa: Nihon Rikugun No Hondo Bōkū Ni Taisuru Kangae To Sono Bōkū Sakusen No 
Ketsumatsu, 11, 2008, p. 92.（柳澤潤「日本陸軍の本土防空に対する考えとその防空作戦の
結末 （The Japanese Army’s Mainland Air Defence Policy and Its Outcome in the Pacific War）」
『防衛省防衛研究所戦史研究年報 （NIDS Military History Studies Annual）』第11号，2008
年，92頁．）
 46 Jun Yanagisawa, Nihon Rikugun, pp. 97–99.
 47 Yū Koide/Masanao Kurahashi: Aich Ni Okeru Kokumin Giyūtai, Rekishi Hyōron, 556, 1996, p. 63.
（小出裕・倉橋正直「愛知における国民義勇隊 （The National Volunteer Force in Aichi 
Prefecture）」『歴史評論』（Historical Journal）556号，1996年，63頁．）
 48 Yōko Sasaki: Sōryokusen To Josei Heishi, Seikyūsya, Tokyo 2001, p. 81.（佐々木陽子『総力戦
と女性兵士（The Total War and Female Soldiers）』青弓社，2001年，81頁．）
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and women who had completed their primary course at a national elementary school as long 
as the men were under the age of  sixty-five and women forty-five, though invalids and preg-
nant women were not allowed to join.  Different units were formed for each region and for 
each function.  The corps’ objective was to enhance Japan’s defence by increasing food sup-
plies and military provisions.  Its operations included air defence, fire protection, repairing 
damage from air raids, setting up wartime factories to disperse production, transporting 
supplies, and jobs relating to food production.
On 13 April 1945, the cabinet decided to form the National Volunteer Combat Force 
(NVCF) (国民義勇戦闘隊 Kokumin Giyū Sentōtai) for the purpose of  ‘forming a one- 
hundred-million-strong force that would drive forward the destruction of  the enemy’.  It was 
agreed that should the necessity arise, the NVFs stationed in the regions that had become part 
of  the battlefield would be placed under the command of  the army and ‘shift’ to becoming 
a combat force (NVCF), and its members would accordingly be obliged to undertake defence 
and combat missions.49  Following the cabinet’s decision, the Volunteer Services Act (義勇
兵役法 Giyū Heieki Hō) was enacted on 22 June 1945.  A large-scale reform of  the military 
services followed.  Men between the ages of  fifteen and sixty, and women aged seventeen 
to forty, excluding those who were already conscripted and army and navy students, were 
designated as members.50  All of  its members were legally considered combatants.51  Those 
eligible to enlist were required to report to their local NVF unit, and those who neglected to 
do so would be fined.  Thus, the overall percentage of  Japanese citizens who were combatants 
rose to forty per cent of  the total population.  The forces that were positioned in preparation 
for decisive mainland battles comprised 2.25 million naval servicemen and 1.3 million army 
soldiers.  Therefore, the NVCF, which had a membership of  28 million, came to account for a 
staggering proportion of  Japan’s defence force.52
While NVCF members were not considered regular army soldiers, they were entitled to 
act as combatants.  If  the situation required them to take up arms, NVCF members would 
 49 Jōkyō Kinpaku Seru Baai Ni Ōzuru Kokumin Sentō Soshiki Ni Kansuru Ken, in Shirō Akazawa 
(ed.): Shiryō Nihon Gendaishi 13 Taiheiyō Sensōka No Kokumin Seikatsu, Ōtshuki Syoten, 1985, 
pp. 527–528.（「状況緊迫セル場合ニ応ズル国民戦闘組織ニ関スル件（The Case of  the 
National Combat Force in the Emergency）」赤澤史朗他編『資料日本現代史13 太平洋戦争下
の国民生活（Archives of  Contemporary Japanese History, 13, the Life of  the Citizens during the 
Pacific War）』大月書店，1985年，527–528頁．）
 50 Chikako Nakayama: Kokumin Giyūtai To Kokumin Sentōtai, Ritsumeikan Heiwa Kenkyū, 1, 
2000, p. 72.（中山知華子「国民義勇隊と国民義勇戦闘隊（The National Volunteer Force and 
the National Volunteer Combat Force）」『立命館平和研究』（The Ritsumeikan Journal of  Peace 
Studies）1号，2000年，72頁．）
 51 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 67.
 52 Koide/Kurahashi, Aich Ni Okeru Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 75.
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be awarded military decorations, and should they fall in battle, they would be honoured 
at Yasukuni Shrine and their families would receive a pension.  By the same token, those 
who contravened military regulations would be punished by senior officers such as the 
District Officer (地区司令官 Chiku Shireikan) or the Commander of  the Combined Volunteer 
Combat Forces (連合義勇戦闘隊隊長 Rengō Giyū Sentōtai Taichō).  There was no distinc-
tion between army and navy, nor were there any ranks.  NVCF members were divided and 
put under the direction of  group leaders, and separate NVCF units were formed for men and 
women.  These units were mustered on an ad hoc basis.  Military uniforms were not provided. 
Members were simply required to wear a white patch of  cloth six centimetres high and seven 
centimetres across which would display the character 戦 (combat) and the person’s name. 
The group leaders would also wear an armband displaying their role.53  Although there are 
examples of  the army providing arms such as rifles to the NVCF, it was not feasible to pro-
vide weapons to every member.54  Thus, many members had to rely on makeshift weapons 
such as sickles, hatchets, knives, and hammers.55
The nature of  the NVF and NVCF varied widely according to region.  For example, in 
coastal regions with high concentrations of  munitions factories and where the fear of  an 
imminent U.S. land invasion was particularly palpable, preparations for ‘decisive mainland 
battles’ and ‘arming of  the general population’ were advanced with a heightened sense of  
urgency.  One such region was Aichi, where the age cap on female membership was raised 
to sixty, and the volunteer force was organised with a strong combat element.  In April 1945, 
in the Tōkai Army Area (which comprised six prefectures, including Aichi), the Student 
Volunteer Force (学徒義勇隊 Gakuto Giyūtai), which was designed to be a combat-ready 
force, was set up within the NVF.  The Student Volunteer Force also provided combat train-
ing for female students.  One teacher and one student from every girls’ school and youth 
school in the six prefectures would be nominated, and then a week’s worth of  training would 
be provided.  The instructors included seven officers and non-officer soldiers, and five army 
hospital nurses.  These instructors provided training behind the lines, and performed sup-
port duties such as first aid, and the distribution of  boiled rice.  Combat training such as 
grenade-throwing practice was also provided.56
However, the government and the army were not eager to ‘shift’ the NVF units towards 
 53 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 74.
 54 Akio Satō: Hondo Kessen To Tōkai Gakuto Giyūtai: Tyūgakusei No Gyokusai Yōin Zukuri, 
Rekishi Hyōron, 556, 1996, pp. 48–52.（佐藤明夫「本土決戦と東海学徒義勇隊―中学生の玉
砕要員づくり―（The Decisive Mainland Battles and the Student Volunteer Force in the Tōkai 
Region）」『歴史評論』（Historical Journal）556号，1996年，48–52頁．）
 55 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 74.
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becoming a combat force (NVCF).57  Chikako Nakayama, examining the formative process of  
the NVF and NVCF, points out that similar organisations were formed in local areas before 
the NVF plan was announced, and that the priority seemed to have been combat training.  In 
the winter of  1944, in an aircraft-building company in Chiba Prefecture, ‘intensive training 
during breaks’ was provided in which ‘male members would practice with bamboo spears 
and female members would practice with pole swords so that for every one member, ten 
enemies will fall’.  However, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki considered such bamboo spear 
training ‘excessive’ and he requested that it be discontinued, arguing that the NVF they were 
envisaging was to make defensive preparations while engaging in production and to carry 
out production while making defensive preparations.58
According to Koide and Kurahashi, who both observed the NVF in Aichi, the principal 
aim behind the formation of  the NVF was to quell the public chaos that would be likely to 
follow an American land invasion and to guide public opinion.59  Until the Japanese army 
ceased organised resistance on 23 June, the total number of  military and civilian casualties 
was over 120,000 in Okinawa, but the number of  citizens being protected by U.S. army was as 
high as 220,000.60  In other words, those citizens in Okinawa who faithfully followed their own 
country’s army were vastly outnumbered by citizens who surrendered independently and 
thereby survived.  There were fears that if  the fighting reached the mainland, many Japanese 
citizens would act with similar autonomy and be a great encumbrance to the Japanese army.61 
The only way to prevent such a situation would be to evacuate citizens from potential con-
flict zones, but this was not a realistic option.62  Means of  transport were limited, as were 
evacuation destinations and food supplies.  Furthermore, a considerable decline in workforce 
productivity would be inevitable.  Therefore, arming the citizens who were forced to remain 
in the conflict zones and incorporating them into the army structure was essential, not only 
in terms of  augmenting the regular army forces, but also as part of  the efforts to forestall the 
 57 Hiroyuki Matsumura: Kokumin Giyūtai Shōron, Rekishigaku Kenkyū, 721, 1999, p. 4.（松村
寛之「国民義勇隊小論―敗戦と国民支配についての一断章（The Essay of  the National 
Volunteer Force）」『歴史学研究』（Journal of  Historical Studies）721号，1999年，4頁．）
 58 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 69.
 59 Koide/Kurahashi, Aich Ni Okeru Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 59.
 60 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 72.
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chaos and confusion that was expected to follow a land invasion by enemy forces.63
4. Conclusion
The U.S. land invasion of  Okinawa forced the Japanese public to ready themselves 
for actual fighting on the mainland.  German air raids sparked the fear of  land invasion 
in Britain.  In both Japan and Britain, there were women who were prepared to fight in the 
Second World War’s ‘decisive battles’.  In light of  the prevailing attitudes towards gender at 
the time, these ‘fighting women’ inevitably caused profound social friction.
How, then, did Japan and Britain differ in terms of  their approach to the mobilisation of  
women for military service?  While in Japan, at the early stages of  the war, women were com-
pletely excluded from the armed forces, in Britain, women had been systematically mobil-
ised as early as before the outbreak of  the war.  It is significant to note that the British had 
already experienced large-scale mobilisation of  women during the First World War, which 
affected the lives of  the people completely.  This suggests that it is necessary to reconsider 
female mobilisation during the Second World War in relation to the experience during the 
First World War.
In the case of  Britain, while women had been conscripted as regular soldiers, they were 
not treated as combatants.  In Japan, at the beginning of  the war, women were excluded from 
the armed forces completely.  Towards the end of  the war, as the Battle of  Okinawa intensi-
fied and a full-scale air raid campaign was launched against mainland cities, Japanese lead-
ers strove to prepare the country for decisive battles by enhancing productivity, organising 
defence forces, and influencing a shaky public opinion.  While the NVF, which was supposed 
to shift to a combat force at the time of  invasion, gave their women the status of  combatants, 
the women who volunteered for the Home Guard in Britain were treated as non-combatants.
Although the degree of  urgency was considerably different, female mobilisation was 
accompanied with gross deviation from conventional gender norms in both countries.  It was 
on the home front that the gender order was disrupted more easily than on the front line.  The 
deterioration of  the war situation, especially the change of  the home front into a battlefield, 
eventually forced governments to embark on the introduction of  general mobilisation.  It led 
to the adoption of  female conscription in Britain and the formation of  the NVCF in Japan.
The critical difference between Japan and Britain, both of  which were faced with the 
threat of  land invasion, was in whether or not the country actually suffered such an invasion. 
In Britain, the prevailing view that a woman’s main role should be that of  a mother meant 
that married women were excluded from conscription.  In Japan, however, women were forced 
to enter the NVF, whether they were married or not.  Japan’s approach to the mobilisation of  
 63 Nakayama, Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 72.
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women was different from Britain’s, a fact that also marked a clear break from Japan’s past 
policies in this regard.  With the threat of  a U.S. land invasion becoming increasingly real, 
and with a clear shortage of  troops prepared to fight decisive mainland battles, Japan had 
no choice but to dissolve the military/civilian distinction and institute universal conscription. 
The NVCF, which also targeted women for enlistment, was not so much a means of  augment-
ing the troops, but one of  public control.64  The underlying objective seemed to be the preven-
tion of  civil chaos ‘when that day [came]’.
Wartime Britain was desperate to supplement its manpower, which was insufficient to 
cope with what had become a protracted and large-scale conflict, and so it mobilised women 
for military service on a scale far beyond that of  the First World War.  Although Parliament 
did not easily come to an agreement upon the approach to be taken concerning the mobilisa-
tion of  women, it did generally agree that large-scale mobilisation, including conscription, 
was unavoidable.  Questions remained as to who should be enlisted (age, married/unmarried, 
with/without children), and what their role would be.  The idea that women’s maternal duties 
should have primacy became the major premise for the debates that ensued in the House of  
Commons.65  The argument that women should not pull the trigger of  a gun met with no resis-
tance, not even from feminist MPs who had argued in favour of  gender equality in the army.
Great pains were taken by the government and the army to maintain the gender status 
quo in the armed forces.  Consequently, there were several gender-based discrepancies in 
wages, rations, pensions, duties, and training.  The greatest priority was placed on preserv-
ing a ‘male-only’ space within the armed forces.  It was the trigger that served as the final 
symbol of  division between men and women.  No matter how proactively women sought to 
fulfil their duties within the military, they were considered non-combatants unqualified to 
pull the trigger of  a gun, and as such, their value was securely positioned below that of  their 
male counterparts.  This ‘trigger principle’ represented the last defence of  women’s maternal 
nature, which the establishment intended to preserve even in the event of  an emergency.  In 
the end, male supremacy was restored within a redefined gender hierarchy by women’s con-
tinued subordination to men.66
However, maintaining the gender status quo in the army by decreeing who could and 
 64 Koide/Kurahashi, Aich Ni Okeru Kokumin Giyūtai, p. 65.
 65 Penny Summerfield, ‘“The Girl that Makes the Thing that Drills the Hole that Holds the Spring…”: 
Discourses of  Women and Work in the Second World War’, Christine Gledhill and Gillian Swanson 
(eds.), Nationalising Femininity: Culture, Sexuality and British Cinema in the Second World War, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 38.
 66 M. R. Higonnet explains why the changes in women’s activities during wartime did not improve 
their status by using the metaphor of  the ‘Double Helix’, its structure of  two intertwined strands. 
Margaret R. Higonnet, Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, London: Yale University 
Press, 1987, p. 34.
TOSHIKO HAYASHIDA
178
who could not pull the trigger was not an easy task in such a high-tech war.  Rapid advances 
in air defence technology and increasing sophistication and systematisation meant that in 
the combat zone, the question of  who pulled the trigger no longer held the same importance 
as it had in the past.67  The difference between defence (air defence) and offence (counter-
attacks) had become paper-thin.  For this reason, the boundary between combat actions and 
non-combat actions became blurred, and this presented a challenge to the intended gender 
barriers within the armed forces.  Some women in the armed forces assisted in the shooting 
down of  enemy planes, carried the guns, and pulled the trigger in rifle practice.  They were 
quietly crossing the gender boundary that politicians and military commanders had tried so 
ardently to defend.
 67 DeGroot, ‘I Love the Scent of  Cordite’, p. 83.
